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Energy Challenges in Latin America
Abstract
Co-edited by Peter Hakim, President Emeritus, Inter-American Dialogue and Genaro Arriagada, Non-
Resident Senior Fellow, Inter-American Dialogue, this issue examines energy as a priority issue for nearly all
Latin American and Caribbean countries and considers its impact on regional integration and both foreign
and domestic policy. Articles present opportunities and challenges facing the region, as well as
recommendations for addressing the energy issue in Latin America in a strategic, constructive and effective
manner.
This issue is available in Hemisphere: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/lacc_hemisphere/vol20/iss1/1
A MAGAZINE OF THE AMERICAS VOLUME 20 • SPRING 2011 • HTTP://LACC.FIU.EDU
Energy Challenges in the Americas
WHO?
The Miami Consortium for Latin American and Caribbean Studies is a dynamic partnership 
between the Latin American and Caribbean Center (LACC) at Florida International University (FIU) 
and the Center for Latin American Studies (CLAS) at the University of Miami (UM). Designated 
as a U.S. Department of Education National Resource Center on Latin America, the Miami 
Consortium for Latin American and Caribbean Studies is recognized as one of the nation’s top 
institutions for the study of Latin America and the Caribbean.  
WHERE?
From its incomparable location in Miami, the Miami Consortium for Latin American and Caribbean 
Studies creates unique and innovative opportunities for South Florida’s leading universities and 
the communities they serve.   
WHAT?
Built on more than 25 years of UM and FIU faculty, student and community collaboration, the 
Miami Consortium for Latin American and Caribbean Studies reaffirms South Florida as THE hub 
for political, commercial, cultural, and scholarly exchange between the U.S. and its neighbors 
to the South, and strategically positions Miami at the center of a broader global dialogue that 
connects the rest of the world to Latin America and the Caribbean.  
HOW?
The Miami Consortium for Latin American and Caribbean Studies spearheads cutting-edge 
research, expands and strengthens international linkages throughout the hemisphere, supports 
cultural and academic exchange, promotes outreach, training, and networking for a broad 
community of scholars, K-12 educators, journalists, governmental officials, and the business 
sector, and develops and implements projects designed to strengthen societies and improve 
the lives of people throughout the hemisphere.
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F R O M  T H E  E D I T O R
Dear Hemisphere readers:
The energy situation in the Americas, not to say the world, is changing rapidly. Developments in the Middle East 
continue to surprise us daily. Contrary to popular belief, however, the principal US oil suppliers are countries not in the 
Middle East or Africa, but rather the Western Hemisphere: Venezuela and Mexico.                    
China and India are increasing their energy demands faster than most analysts predicted and are assiduously courting 
suppliers for the long haul. The energy market has become a seller’s market and is likely to continue to be one in the 
coming years. Latin America’s oil and gas reserves, as well as the region’s hydroelectric potential and relatively low overall 
consumption, put most of the countries in this region in an enviable position when facing their energy future. The 
landscape, however, is rapidly changing. 
Traditional Latin American energy powerhouses are seeing a rapid decline in their energy production (Mexico), while 
new oil (Brazil) and gas (Bolivia) reserves are being discovered in places impossible to reach with available technology 
until very recently. Despite great technological advances, the recent oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico showed the world how 
fragile the ecological balance can be and the consequences of accidents, whether manmade or natural.
The increasing double threat of global warming and climate change has introduced new variables to the energy 
equation. Price is no longer the only factor driving the search for alternative energy sources. Protecting the right to a clean 
environment for future generations is another very important determinant. 
This year we have devoted our annual issue of Hemisphere to the problem of Energy Challenges in the Americas. I would 
like to thank my colleagues and friends from the Inter-American Dialogue Energy Task Force for agreeing to join forces with 
LACC to produce this volume. 
In addition to the pieces authored by the Inter-American Dialogue Energy Task Force members we have included 
commentaries by two FIU faculty members and one graduate student. Some authors address broad themes; others focus on 
specific issues, regions or countries. As usual the idea is not to give you, the reader, an exhaustive view, but to invite you to 
explore the issues from new comparative and cross-disciplinary perspectives.
With this issue of Hemisphere LACC begins a longer debate on energy in the Americas. This year’s Journalists and 
Editors Workshop on Latin America and the Caribbean, LACC’s traditional yearly gathering of media professionals 
covering Latin America and the Caribbean, will be devoted to discussing different aspects of this topic. Some of the issues 
we will address include opportunities and challenges from the perspectives of the haves and have-nots, those posed by the 
new global and regional geopolitics of energy, and the diminishing costs of alternative energy sources. 
Many people have contributed to this issue of Hemisphere and I am grateful to them all. In addition to the Dialogue’s 
Energy Task Force members I would like to thank Peter Hakim, Chris Cote and Alexis Arthur from the Inter-American 
Dialogue, and Liesl Picard, Andreina Fernández and Alisa Newman from LACC. 
Thank you,
Cristina Eguizábal
Director
Latin American and Caribbean Center
Florida International University
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F R O M  T H E  G U E S T  E D I T O R S
Dear readers:
The fact that energy has become a priority issue for nearly all Latin American nations was our central motivation 
for establishing the Inter-American Dialogue’s Energy Policy Group. This assertion needs no explanation; energy is a 
critical element in every country’s thinking about and planning for its future. Energy has become a key factor affecting 
the pace and success of regional integration processes and is shaping the foreign policies and domestic choices of many 
Latin American countries. 
Moreover, the problems associated with energy are subject to rapid change. They must be tracked and analyzed on 
a regular basis. In the past year, we have witnessed wide swings in the price of energy. Latin American countries are 
giving renewed attention to nuclear power; Brazil has taken major steps to prepare for the exploitation of newly found 
petroleum deposits and is building the world’s third largest dam; and poor management is leading to declining oil 
production in Mexico and Venezuela, the region’s largest exporters. 
In country after country, energy has emerged as a central political issue. Politics and ideology (as much as 
calculations of national interest) are shaping and constraining energy decisions, and government choices about energy 
are affecting the national politics and foreign policies of many nations.  In the absence of new discoveries, Mexico’s oil 
reserves are rapidly being depleted; yet, it is politically risky for any Mexican government to consider allowing foreign 
investment into the petroleum sector. Venezuela’s regional influence depends heavily on its ability to assist the resource-
poor countries of Central America and the Caribbean to meet their energy needs. Protests and demonstrations, which 
forced Bolivia to rescind essential price increases in natural gas, have weakened the government of Evo Morales. Even 
Chevron’s court battles in Ecuador are as much about politics as they are about the environment. 
Decisions about energy production and use in any one Latin American country affect the economies and politics of 
many other nations. Brazil’s largest city, São Paulo, depends on natural gas exports from Bolivia, while the Bolivian 
economy relies on Brazilian purchases. Argentina has a similar link to Bolivia. Chile depends on natural gas imports 
from its neighbors Peru, Argentina and Bolivia but cannot fully count on a reliable supply.  It is planning to turn to 
much higher priced LNG imports and perhaps develop a nuclear energy capacity. 
We are pleased to have this opportunity to showcase the initial work of the Energy Policy Group, which was 
launched in 2009 with the cooperation and support of the Inter-American Development Bank. The group’s 
approximately 20 participants include energy experts and political and economic analysts, who meet to discuss the 
most important energy policy challenges confronting the region’s governments, offer balanced analysis of issues and 
choices, and develop ideas and approaches for addressing them in constructive ways. Many of the articles in this issue 
of Hemisphere were prepared by members of the group during its first year of operation. The Dialogue also publishes 
the Latin America Energy Advisor, a highly regarded weekly newsletter that offers up-to-date information and timely 
analysis of hemispheric energy issues.
We very much hope that you enjoy this issue of Hemisphere and find the conclusions and recommendations that 
have emerged from the Dialogue’s policy group to be instructive and useful. We owe a debt of gratitude to FIU’s 
Latin American and Caribbean Center and its director, Cristina Eguizábal, for giving us this opportunity to present 
the group’s work. We would also like to acknowledge and thank Alexis Arthur and Chris Cote of the Dialogue staff 
for the editing and other contributions they made to assembling this issue. It would not have been possible without 
their help.
Sincerely,
Peter Hakim
President Emeritus
Inter-American Dialogue
Genaro Arriagada
 Non-Resident Senior Fellow
Inter-American Dialogue
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Leading Energy Policy Issues  
in Latin America
By Genaro Arriagada
E nergy is a leading world concern. A fundamental factor in determining the might and weight of nations is the skill 
with which they handle energy 
policy. Tensions among states are 
increasingly linked to the security 
of energy supplies, prices and 
transportation. In this context, 
analyses from the viewpoint of 
politics and strategic and power 
considerations among states gain 
new importance in addressing 
energy issues. 
Compared to other world 
regions, Latin America’s energy 
mix reveals special circumstances, 
challenges, problems and policies. 
The table illustrates the percentage 
of total consumption by energy 
source and region. 
Latin America is an area rich in oil, 
hydroelectric power and gas, with 
enormous reserves and production 
that exceeds consumption, making 
it a net energy exporter. By contrast, 
the share of coal and nuclear energy 
in the mix is very small. 
Since energy policy should be 
based on the use of all sources rather 
than a single one, a view of the 
overall energy mix is fundamental to 
discussing and formulating long-
term policy. Environmental concern 
about greenhouse gas emissions has 
given new momentum to once-
controversial energy sources, such 
as dams and nuclear power plants. 
Such considerations should not 
obscure economic factors essential 
to growth, for the cleanest energy 
sources—wind and solar—are 
among the most expensive. A purely 
economic logic favors investment in 
coal, which is the cheapest source 
but also the most polluting.
Between now and 2030—
assuming that energy consumption 
rises 60%, the mix remains clean, 
and the increase in energy costs is 
minor—Latin America should set 
the following general energy policy 
goals: (1) maintain the current share 
of hydroelectric power; (2) slightly 
reduce the oil share; (3) maintain 
the natural gas share; (4) reduce 
the coal share; (5) reduce the role 
of traditional biomass, especially 
if associated with extreme poverty; 
(6) maintain or, ideally, increase the 
nuclear energy share; and (7) increase 
the Non-Conventional Renewable 
Energy (NCRE) contribution to 10-
15% of the mix.
Analysis of Energy Sources
Having set the general framework, 
it is important to analyze the 
different components of the energy 
grid. These are at varying degrees of 
development, pose distinct problems 
and opportunities, and should be 
addressed through different policies.
Oil. Excluding the Middle East, 
Latin America is the region where oil 
makes the largest contribution to the 
fuel pool, even more than in the “oil-
addicted” United States. South and 
Central America, the Caribbean and 
Mexico together account for 15.8% 
of proven reserves and 12.8% of 
world production, which compares 
favorably to their 8.8% share of 
consumption. 
Recently, however, highly favorable 
conditions have given way to 
uncertainty due to stagnating, even 
declining production in most of 
Energy Mix 2009 
Oil Gas Coal Nuclear Hydro Total
North America 38.5 27.6 20.0 8.0 5. 9 100.0
South & Central 
America
45.5 21.5  4.0 0.8 28.2 100.0
Europe-Eurasia 33.0 34.4 16.5 9.5 6.6 100.0
Middle East 51.0 47.2 1.4 0.0 0.4 100.0
Africa 40.0 23.4 29.7 0.8 6.1 100.0
Asia-Pacific 29.1 10.8 51.9 3.0 5.2 100.0
World Total 34.8 23.8 29.3 5.5  6.6 100.0
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2010.
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South America and Mexico. The 
Mexican state underfunds the oil 
sector, and oil reforms approved by 
the Mexican Congress are seen as too 
limited. In Venezuela, too, the oil 
situation is deteriorating rapidly. 
Brazil, in contrast, has emerged 
as a success story when it comes to 
oil exploration and production. In 
1997 it accounted for two-thirds 
of South America’s crude imports, 
but by 2009 it was self-sufficient in 
energy and ready to join the exclusive 
club of oil-exporting countries. Its 
results are so favorable that by the 
end of the decade it will probably 
overtake Venezuela and Mexico as 
the hemisphere’s leading producer. In 
Brazil, an active state policy coexists 
with a company, Petrobras, which 
combines the features of state-owned 
and private enterprise within a 
regulatory framework that allows it to 
avoid the dilemmas of overly liberal 
policies or unyielding statism.
Outside of Brazil, Latin America’s 
oil future is under threat unless 
there is an effort to increase sector 
efficiency, particularly in Mexico, 
Argentina, Venezuela and Ecuador. 
Natural gas. The contribution 
of gas to the regional energy mix is 
close to the world average: 22.2% 
compared to a global average of 
23.7%. When it comes to reserves 
and production, however, gas is less 
satisfactory than oil. Latin America 
owns 4.1% of proven reserves and 
production matches consumption, 
6.3% of the world total. Venezuela 
and Bolivia have immense reserves 
but sector development is lagging. 
Brazil, Peru and Trinidad & Tobago 
have more successfully managed their 
gas sectors.
The South American liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) market 
started in 2008 following the 
announcement of plans to build at 
least seven regasification plants. This 
strengthened the overall regional 
energy situation but weakened 
integration efforts. A more optimistic 
way to view the relationship between 
LNG and integration is to say 
that classic gas integration—via 
pipelines—is on the way out, but 
the door has opened for integration 
on the basis of LNG, with close 
cooperation between neighboring 
countries: Chile and Peru, Brazil and 
Argentina.
Coal. This will continue to be the 
fastest-growing fuel and its share in 
the Latin American mix —a low 
one-seventh of the world average—
is likely to increase, driven by low 
costs and difficulties in developing 
hydroelectric and nuclear energy. 
The role of coal is small and limited 
to Brazil, Chile and Colombia, 
which account for 85% of regional 
consumption. At the same time, 
however, Central and South America 
represent the world area where coal 
consumption is growing the fastest. 
This increase will tend to muddy a 
comparatively clean energy mix. 
Hydroelectric power. Latin 
America, South America in 
particular, is the world’s richest 
hydroelectric region, with 
22% of the global total for this 
resource and four times the world 
average. However, opposition by 
environmental groups to new dams 
has led to conflicts in Chile, Brazil, 
Guatemala, Mexico, Honduras, 
El Salvador, Peru and other 
countries. Such confrontations 
pit environmentalists, native 
communities and large 
international NGOs opposed to 
dams (and nuclear energy or even 
oil development) against large 
corporations, governments and 
multilateral lenders that support 
development based on such factors 
as cost and security or clean energy 
concerns. Proponents argue that 
nuclear power is a sustainable option 
for a continent that has decided to 
halt hydroelectric development and 
should not rely on coal.
Nuclear energy. Nuclear energy 
comprises 6% of the world energy 
Itaipu’s Brazilian General Director, Jorge Miguel Samek, speaks to journalists about the controversial 
hydroelectric dam, which is co-owned by Paraguay and Brazil, during a press conference at the 
São Paulo State Industry Federation (FIESP) headquarters in São Paulo, Brazil, on May 27, 2009. 
Photo: Mauricio Lima/AFP/Getty Images.
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mix, but in Latin America it accounts 
for less than 1%. Since 2006, 
governments have espoused the 
necessity of developing this sector 
given such factors as climate change, 
high oil prices, and dwindling 
reserves and production. Brazil 
and Argentina have announced 
new nuclear plants, the debate in 
Mexico is growing more strident, 
and Uruguay has set up a bipartisan 
commission to review the issue. 
Chile may soon become the fourth 
Latin American country to integrate 
nuclear energy into the mix. In 
Venezuela, the Chávez administration 
has been flirting with nuclear energy 
that uses Russian and Iranian 
technology. 
Traditional biomass. The oldest 
form of energy is traditional biomass 
for heating, lighting and cooking. 
Its use is often associated with 
extreme poverty, and some 100 
million Latin Americans rely on 
traditional biomass to meet their 
basic energy needs. Firewood, the 
most characteristic use of biomass, 
is hard to quantify, but it accounts 
for a very high share of the mix in 
the poor nations of Central America 
and the Caribbean. Yet, firewood 
could be used rationally in countries 
with vast forests, the technology to 
process farm waste, and thoughtful 
forest management plans. One of the 
Millennium Development Goals is 
to give the poor, who otherwise have 
only traditional biomass, access to 
modern energy sources. 
Non-Conventional Renewable 
Energy. This includes run-of-river 
hydroelectric plants, wind, solar, 
geothermal, and non-traditional 
biomass such as sugar cane, corn-
based and cellulosic ethanol. While 
they currently contribute only 2% 
of the Latin American mix, these 
sources are critical to addressing 
climate change and will be a focal 
point of future debate. Clean to 
varying degrees, some of these 
sources have non-trivial negative 
effects. Worldwide use of non-
conventional renewable energy has 
been rising rapidly but its overall 
contribution remains scant. In 
general, its development hinges on 
subsidy policies that poor and even 
middle-income economies, such 
as those of Latin America, cannot 
afford to any significant extent. Still, 
there have been success stories with 
some forms of renewable energy in 
individual countries.
Non-conventional hydrocarbons. 
The hemisphere holds remarkable 
possibilities for development of 
“non-conventional” or “tough” 
hydrocarbons, including Canada’s 
tar sands or the ultra heavy oils of 
Venezuela’s Orinoco Basin, which 
could total as much as double 
the reserves of Saudi Arabia. The 
technical and financial issues in 
developing these resources are 
enormous and the environmental 
impact is also being questioned, 
particularly with regard to tar 
sands. Interestingly, high-profile 
observers note that the distinction 
between conventional and non-
conventional oil is irrelevant since 
at the end of the day, any oil that 
markets can integrate in terms of 
cost and price is conventional. In 
this sense, the ultra heavy oils of 
the Orinoco have better prospects 
than Canada’s tar sands.
Energy Regions in the Hemisphere
Specific local circumstances and 
issues call for different policies, 
making it most expedient to view 
the hemisphere as not one zone 
but three: Central America and the 
Caribbean; South America; and 
North America, including Mexico, 
the United States and Canada.
Central America and the 
Caribbean encompass 23 nations 
with an energy deficit. Only 
Guatemala and Cuba produce some 
oil, although not enough to meet 
domestic demand. Oil accounts 
for more than 70% of the energy 
mix in many of these nations. They 
possess limited refining capacities, 
compounding dependence. The 
Central American and Caribbean 
Itaipu’s Paraguayan General Director, Carlos Mateo Balmelli. Photo: Mauricio Lima/AFP/Getty Images.
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zone also has virtually no gas, except 
for Trinidad and Tobago, home to 
a significant exportable surplus. 
Countries in this area possess 
modest hydroelectric resources and 
no access to nuclear energy in the 
foreseeable future.
Energy is one of the bottlenecks 
to growth in Central America and 
the Caribbean. Oil becomes an 
instrument of policy whenever a 
strong imbalance of power emerges 
between a country with a surfeit of 
the resource and another that needs 
it urgently. A state may prevail over 
another in such a situation, reinforced 
by subsidized prices or soft financing 
terms. Within the hemisphere, this 
zone is the most likely to experience 
such relationships. 
South America, in contrast, is rich 
in energy resources. Exportable oil 
surpluses are significant and proven 
reserves very high. Venezuela, Bolivia 
and Peru have vast gas reserves 
and Brazil has recently reported 
major discoveries. The hydroelectric 
potential is enormous.
Major differences underlie this 
scenario. Chile and Uruguay 
are weakest, with large energy 
shortfalls. Paraguay compensates its 
shortcomings with the enormous 
flow of electricity from large dams 
on its borders with Brazil and 
Argentina. All other countries 
show positive balances but their 
prospects differ. Brazil exemplifies 
successful policy management while 
Venezuela, Argentina and Ecuador 
face declining production and 
deteriorating energy sectors.
Latin America is the leading oil 
exporter to the United States. The 
US has a strong energy deficit, in 
contrast to Mexico and Canada, 
both with excess production. But 
in Mexico, too, as we have noted, 
energy production is on the decline. 
In fact, North America is the region 
of the world where the reserves-to-
production ratio is lowest.
The disparities among these three 
zones create both challenges and 
opportunities for energy partnerships.
Security, Integration and 
Geopolitics
Energy security is an elusive 
concept. At its most basic it 
requires an uninterrupted flow of 
energy at a reasonable price.
While cuts in supply are the 
foremost threat to security, 
responsibility for them varies. 
Many cuts occur for reasons 
beyond the fault or control of 
states or companies, although 
cutting or threatening to cut the 
energy supply may be used as an 
instrument of political pressure. 
Security can also be threatened 
when a relatively more powerful 
country sets an unfair price—either 
too high (if it is a supplier) or 
too low (if it is a consumer), thus 
affecting a weaker nation. Cartels 
may distort prices and, more 
seriously, put conditions on supply. 
Because of oil’s fungible nature, 
its use for political purposes is 
limited. Exports to one country 
that are diverted to another will 
simply be replaced with other 
exports. The main concern is 
whether the reduction of one 
source can limit the global supply. 
Natural gas is different, as about 
70% of the gas supply does not 
trade on the open market. Prices 
and quantities are fixed in long-
term contracts between countries 
joined by a pipeline, creating 
strict, reciprocal dependence 
between exporter and importer. 
The LNG market resembles the 
oil market with the restriction 
that it requires consumers to build 
regasification plants.
Experience shows that higher 
levels of energy security come 
not from autarchy but from 
diversification of the energy mix. 
Security through diversification 
and leverage of economic benefits 
are among the factors that drive 
integration. The leading forms of 
energy integration are linkages 
through gas pipelines and power 
grids, but development of either in 
Latin America is nascent at best. 
In the case of natural gas, progress 
has been hobbled by political or 
geopolitical factors. 
Nations such as China or India, 
whose greatest concern is to secure 
the energy supplies their growth 
plans require, are increasingly 
active in Latin America. As a 
result, the geopolitical energy 
equation must consider not just 
large producers, but also and most 
especially large overseas importers 
and their investments in the area.
Prospects for energy security 
would benefit greatly from a 
regional accord or convention 
designed to guarantee that energy 
supplies will not be arbitrarily cut 
by signatory states. This may not 
be easy to achieve.
Experience shows that energy security comes 
from a diversification of the energy mix.
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Geopolitically, the presence of 
extra-continental powers in the 
region as well as tensions between 
countries in the hemisphere should 
be watched. Examples include: 
(1) any vacuum created by the 
suspension or reduction of projects 
or promises made to countries and 
governments by Venezuela, whose 
oil slump may make fulfillment 
impossible; (2) how the United 
States will address eventual export 
declines by Mexico and Venezuela; 
and (3) tension between Brazil and 
Bolivia over natural gas, not only 
as related to Brazilian investments 
in Bolivia, but also to those arising 
from Brazil’s shift from deficit 
to self-sufficiency and even to 
exporting.
Savings, Prices and Public 
Corporations
Any energy policy must consider 
three fundamental elements: 
efficiency, public corporations and 
energy prices.
Energy efficiency is a priority 
objective of a consistent policy. 
Nearly all Latin American 
countries have the ability to reduce 
consumption at a reasonable cost 
using measures within reach of 
institutions and individuals. Energy 
efficiency can yield a remarkably 
high economic return and makes 
a significant contribution toward 
addressing climate change.
The largest players in the Latin 
American energy arena, especially as 
pertains to oil and gas, are National 
Oil Companies (NOCs). Many 
types of NOCs exist, varying by 
corporate governance systems and 
relations with the state, the private 
sector and society. These models are 
differentiated by the way NOCs 
address rent take (production sharing 
or concession-based contracts); 
whether private participation exists 
(in exploration and production, or 
in company ownership); how and 
by whom the company is governed; 
and the sector’s price policy. Brazil’s 
Petrobras and Venezuela’s PDVSA are 
examples of NOCs that address these 
issues in divergent ways. NOCs are 
likely to continue to dominate the 
oil industry, especially in Mexico and 
South America, and the quality of 
their performance is a central energy 
policy issue in Latin America.
The study of pricing and subsidy 
policies is an issue of special 
concern, as in Latin America these 
can be an obstacle to consistent 
energy policies. They interfere with 
efficiency, discourage investment, 
distort demand, do not always favor 
the poorest and are a disincentive to 
integration. 
Subsidies, first cousins of pricing, 
tend to be high in Latin America. 
Venezuela, for instance, has some 
of the world’s lowest gasoline 
prices at enormous public cost. 
Subsidies in Venezuela and Ecuador 
represent 8.3% and 6.7% of GDP, 
respectively. In some cases, subsidies 
are high and lack transparency. 
Their cost and financing are unclear 
and they sometimes benefit the 
affluent sectors of society. At the 
same time, many non-conventional 
renewable energy sources are 
costly and can only be developed 
if supported by subsidies. This 
forces a discussion within a broad 
perspective about the advisability 
of investing in non-conventional 
renewable energy without 
impacting global economic growth 
or diverting funds from other areas, 
especially social needs.
Latin America and Climate 
Change
Energy’s golden era of fossil fuels 
is coming to an end. Humankind 
has agreed that such a system is 
unsustainable and must be stopped 
due to high levels of carbon dioxide 
emissions and their contribution to 
climate change. 
Latin America is not a large 
contributor to greenhouse gas 
emissions. The region adds a mere 
6% to the world total, thanks to 
low levels of industrial output and 
public transportation emissions and 
the weight of hydroelectric power in 
the energy mix. The region’s greatest 
potential contribution to climate 
change is deforestation. 
Regional energy policies have 
already begun to address the climate 
change challenge. Important 
initiatives include hydroelectric 
power and increased energy 
efficiency. Nuclear energy too cannot 
be ignored. The controversies over 
its development, mostly political 
(nuclear weapon proliferation) and 
safety-related (risk of accident) 
cannot obscure the fact that it is a 
clean source of energy in terms of 
greenhouse gas emissions.
To the above policies—whether any 
or all are adopted—one must add 
the fundamental role to be played by 
non-conventional renewable energy 
for its contribution to reducing 
carbon dioxide emissions and fossil 
fuel dependence. In general, non-
conventional renewable energy 
is expensive and hard to develop 
without subsidy support. Production 
costs have declined significantly 
in recent years, however, and 
there is active discussion about 
international financing tools that 
could make it accessible to countries 
with lower relative development. 
Latin American countries should 
continue their efforts to invest in 
non-conventional renewable energy 
and develop new, more accessible 
technologies. They should do so 
with caution, however, ensuring that 
development does not create a heavy 
subsidy burden or pronounced 
energy price increases. ■
Genaro Arriagada is a non-resident 
senior fellow at the Inter-American 
Dialogue.
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Energy Conflicts: A Growing 
Concern in Latin America
By Patricia I. Vásquez
T
he past decade 
has witnessed a 
proliferation of 
energy projects in 
Latin America. Many 
have been central to the domestic 
economic development plans of 
governments; others have been 
efforts to expand much-delayed 
regional energy cooperation or 
consolidate a particular political 
agenda across borders. As oil, gas 
and hydroelectricity developments 
have multiplied, so have conflicts 
brought on by the negative political, 
social, environmental and/or 
economic externalities these projects 
have generated.   
While the dynamics of the 
conflicts vary, the disputes at 
national and local levels share 
two underlying triggers: first, 
Latin America’s deep-rooted 
economic inequality and the 
marginalization of certain societal 
groups; and second, weak state 
management of the revenue from 
extractive industries. The region 
succeeded in reducing inequality 
levels in the last decade through 
Protesters burning Christmas decorations in La Paz during a December 30, 2010 Gasolinazo protest against a decree by Bolivian President Evo Morales 
to remove fuel subsidies. Photo by James Brunker/Latin Content/Getty Images.
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improved education and increased 
transfers to the poor. The quality 
of the education the poor receive, 
however, remains lower than that 
attained by the top 10% of the 
population, and redistribution is 
minimal.
Persistent social and economic 
differences in spite of increased 
natural resource revenues in 
producing countries create 
frustration among the population 
and are at the heart of energy-
related conflicts in Latin America. 
These conflicts can be regional, 
national or local. Regional 
conflicts may be geopolitical; in 
other words, related to the use of 
energy, particularly oil, as a tool 
for building political alliances 
across borders, or border conflicts 
related to unresolved, long-term 
geographical frictions that hinder 
energy cooperation between 
nations. At the national level, 
disputes stem from revenue conflicts 
or clashes over the distribution of 
natural resource revenues among 
different ethnic or economic 
groups. Local conflicts, in turn, 
emerge from disputes within the 
boundaries of areas under oil, gas or 
hydroelectricity development.  
Revenue and local conflicts 
in particular build on historical 
economic inequalities, especially 
those affecting ethnic minorities, 
in addition to weak institutional 
frameworks and incomplete 
implementation of the rule of 
law. If not addressed properly 
and in a timely manner, these 
disputes may prove a challenge for 
economic development models 
based on extractive industries and 
threaten the stability of democratic 
governments. 
 
Geopolitical Conflicts
Countries with large hydrocarbon 
reserves sometimes leverage their 
abundant resources to exert 
political pressure on governments 
dependent on energy imports. In 
other situations, they may use the 
wealth they accumulate through 
exports to push broader political 
or ideological agendas. Russia, 
in its handling of gas supplies to 
its European customers, fueled a 
geopolitical conflict. 
In Latin America, Venezuelan 
President Hugo Chávez has used 
his country’s ample oil and gas 
reserves—80.5 billion barrels of 
proven oil and 149 trillion cubic 
feet of natural gas—to craft energy 
cooperation initiatives that have 
gained political allies. The specter 
of supply interruption hangs over 
those who do not share his ideology. 
Chávez, a strong critic of the United 
States, has also used his country’s 
hydrocarbon might to challenge 
opposition political views. 
Border Conflicts
The most challenging border 
conflict in the region is between 
Bolivia and Chile and traces its 
origin to more than century ago. 
Since the War of the Pacific in 
the 1880s, when Chile took away 
Bolivia’s access to the Pacific 
Ocean and left it landlocked, 
Bolivians have maintained a 
historic claim for return of 
the coastline. That grievance 
resurfaced in 2002 in the form 
of massive popular opposition 
in Bolivia to proposals to export 
gas from new reserves through a 
Chilean port. Violent uprisings 
left dozens dead and ousted two 
presidents—Gonzalo Sánchez de 
Lozada in 2003 and his successor, 
Carlos Mesa, in 2005—in what 
became known as the “Gas War.”
When the private consortium 
project to export Bolivia’s gas fell 
through, the companies turned 
to Peru instead. Had the original 
export venture succeeded, it 
would have turned Bolivia, South 
America’s poorest country, into 
the region’s first exporter of liquid 
natural gas (LNG). Instead, that 
privilege is enjoyed by Peru, which 
became Latin America’s first LNG 
exporter in 2010.
Revenue Conflicts
Estimates of Bolivia’s proven 
natural gas reserves increased from 
roughly 4.3 trillion cubic feet (tcf ) 
in 2000 to 27 tcf in 2009. Bolivia 
has since been immersed in a 
long period of political instability 
as opposing groups struggle to 
control gas resources. This struggle 
has highlighted Bolivia’s persistent 
class and ethnic differences: The 
relatively small percentage of the 
population of Spanish descent, 
which controls the gas-rich 
southeastern provinces of Tarija, 
Santa Cruz and Cochabamba, has 
squared off against the majority 
indigenous population in the 
country’s western highlands. 
Underlying these differences are 
historical economic inequalities, as 
revenues from the eastern energy-
producing departments have 
usually failed to improve the living 
standards of the poor in the rest of 
the country. 
In March 1990, a nationwide 
march organized by the indigenous 
population —Marcha por el 
Territorio y la Dignidad (March 
for Territory and Dignity)—
precipitated a series of laws 
that increased recognition of 
indigenous peoples’ rights and 
their participation in the country’s 
political life. Most important 
among them was the Law of 
Popular Participation, which 
aimed to decentralize state power 
by transferring political and 
administrative control – and 20% 
of the national budget – to local 
municipalities. 
The ascendancy of indigenous 
President Evo Morales in 2006, 
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which marked the first time Bolivia’s 
majority indigenous population has 
held political power, can be traced 
to the push for inclusion that gained 
momentum throughout the 1990s. 
Morales also sought economic 
power through greater control of the 
profitable gas revenues in Bolivia’s 
southeastern states. Rather than 
acting as a balancing force, however, 
his election deepened the divide 
between the rich eastern lowlands 
and the poor western highlands. 
Morales set out to mandate a 
redistribution of some 30% of gas 
revenues to pay for social programs 
for retirees, public school students 
and other groups in the western 
states. The move weakened the 
autonomy movement, but many 
governance inefficiencies continue 
to create popular discontent. 
Clientelism, rent-seeking practices 
and corruption persist, particularly 
within the state-owned oil company 
(Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales de 
Bolivia, or YPFB). Most important, 
thriving gas revenues, which went 
from $620 million in 2004 to $3.2 
billion in 2008 (more as a function 
of price than increased investments), 
have failed to improve the livelihood 
of most poor Bolivians. 
Morales is trying to reach a 
balance between the gas industry 
and growing discontent among 
indigenous groups who have yet 
to enjoy the benefits of oil and 
gas projects in their territories. 
Pushing forward with hydrocarbon 
development could erode Morales’s 
indigenous support, open the way 
to increased confrontation from his 
own constituency and lead to the 
development of local conflicts.
Local Conflicts
With conventional oil reserves 
becoming harder to tap around 
the world, a new and largely 
undeveloped hydrocarbons 
frontier in the heart of the 
Amazon has attracted the interest 
of governments and oil and gas 
producers. Similarly, attempts by 
Latin American governments to 
promote regional energy integration 
and cooperation have resulted in 
several new hydroelectric projects, 
again mostly in the Amazon, as part 
of the South American Regional 
Infrastructure Integration Initiative 
(IIRSA). The growing emergence of 
oil, gas and hydroelectric projects 
in areas inhabited by indigenous 
communities that are now more 
effectively voicing their grievances 
has spawned a proliferation of local 
conflicts. 
Energy-related local conflicts 
are arguably the most difficult 
to solve because of the variety of 
actors involved, the complexity 
of the issues that need resolution 
and the intricacy of the applicable 
legal framework. The potential for 
such conflicts to spread depends on 
several triggers:
1. The environmental and social 
standards of the company 
involved in the energy 
projects. In the past decade, 
Latin America has seen a 
proliferation of small oil 
and gas companies as well as 
large national oil companies 
(NOCs), some of which 
observe less stringent social 
and environmental safeguards 
than the big majors. 
2. The local community’s 
level of radicalization and 
opposition to the energy project. 
Indigenous movements have 
radicalized their actions and 
gained more sophisticated 
negotiating skills across 
Latin America in the past 
two decades. The extent of 
opposition and radicalization 
may depend on various 
factors, among them local 
culture, the historical 
relationship between the 
community and extractive 
industries, and NGO 
involvement. 
3. The availability of institutional 
mechanisms to mediate 
conflicts. Latin American 
countries often lack well-
functioning institutions with 
the capacity to effectively 
mediate conflicts. An 
exception to this rule is the 
Peruvian Ombudsman’s 
Office, which holds a high 
degree of legitimacy among 
all stakeholders and has 
succeeded in de-escalating 
conflicts. Local NGOs 
usually have lower success 
rates in mediating energy-
related conflicts. 
4. The extent of law enforcement. 
A constant source of energy 
conflicts is laws that are 
overlooked or improperly 
applied, or an abundance 
of overlapping rules that 
Protesters demonstrated against the construction 
of the Belo Monte Dam in Brazil in front of 
the Brazilian Permanent Mission to the United 
Nations on April 28, 2010 in New York City. 
Photo by Ben Hider/Getty Images.
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make them confusing and 
inoperative. Combined 
with government failure to 
comply with international 
legal standards, such as 
those imposed by the 
ILO 169 Convention and 
the UN Declaration of 
the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, ineffective law 
enforcement could lead 
populations affected by 
energy development to resort 
to violence to seek answers to 
their problems. 
5. The existence of old grievances 
or a history of negative 
externalities related to 
energy projects.  In areas 
with a history of social or 
environmental damage from 
previous energy projects, 
local inhabitants tend to 
more actively oppose similar 
new developments. Such 
communities also tend to be 
more radicalized. The best 
example is the widespread 
opposition to new dams in 
light of the deep scars left by 
similar projects in the past.
6. The level and nature of 
involvement of international 
non-governmental 
organizations in the conflict. 
International NGOs 
have grown in power and 
sophistication over the last 
20 years and are particularly 
active in the Amazon. They 
play a fundamental role in 
supporting communities 
in their negotiations with 
companies and governments, 
but have also been accused of 
contributing to the escalation 
of some conflicts by imposing 
agendas that do not fully 
represent the demands of local 
communities.
7. The degree to which companies 
and governments comply 
with previous agreements 
with local communities. A 
government’s or company’s 
failure to comply with a 
previous commitment to 
a community leaves locals 
feeling betrayed and is often a 
source of conflict. Trust that is 
eroded is difficult to rebuild. 
Communities often protest 
the breach of contract with 
force or violence.
Frequently underlying these 
seven elements are the historic 
economic disadvantage and social 
and political exclusion of the 
affected population. In many cases, 
indigenous communities find 
themselves suddenly negotiating 
with large oil corporations for 
access to basic education. Quasi-
isolated and forgotten groups see 
these negotiations as their only 
chance to draw attention to their 
living conditions and improve their 
livelihood, or at least gain access to 
basic services. When the outcome 
of the negotiations is perceived to 
be unfair, communities affected by 
energy projects may resort to protests 
and sometimes violence to express 
their dissatisfaction. Conflict in 
these circumstances may become 
an instrument for forcing some 
kind of a solution to old grievances. 
Increased coordination over shared 
grievances by indigenous groups 
at the international, national and 
regional levels often exacerbates the 
conflicts. Unless properly addressed, 
discontent over historical injustices 
could build and become a source 
of democratic destabilization. 
The deadly confrontations in the 
Peruvian Amazon city of Bagua in 
2009 offered a glimpse of this threat. 
        
Potential Political Repercussions
There are four types of energy-
related conflicts in Latin America: 
geopolitical and border conflicts at 
the regional level; revenue conflicts 
at the national level; and local 
conflicts with the potential to reach 
national importance unless properly 
addressed. Geopolitical and border 
conflicts normally receive the most 
attention from the general public 
and the media. Revenue and local 
conflicts, however, carry a greater 
risk of destabilizing the region by 
building on largely unresolved 
inequalities, weak governance and 
the increasing radicalization of the 
indigenous movement.
Expanded energy projects are 
necessary for economic growth 
in Latin America, where installed 
hydroelectric capacity remains very 
low and large oil and gas reserves 
await development. At the same 
time, the infrastructure required 
for such projects constitutes a 
tremendous risk factor, as most of 
the still-untapped oil and water 
sources are in environmentally and 
socially sensitive areas. 
These social and environmental 
fragilities, combined with the dire 
economic reality and historical 
marginalization of the communities 
affected by energy development, 
generate gradually more conflictive 
situations. Unless addressed rapidly 
and properly, these conflicts could 
pose important challenges to Latin 
America’s political stability and the 
region’s prospects for economic 
growth. ■
Patricia I. Vásquez is an independent 
energy expert and former senior 
fellow at the US Institute of Peace, 
and an advisor on energy and 
sustainable development issues.
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Latin America’s Nuclear Future
By Jorge Zanelli Iglesias
W hat are the challenges and opportunities for nuclear power in Latin 
America? Will nuclear energy 
continue to be a marginal player 
in electric generation in the region 
(2% vs. 15% worldwide)? Are 
the drivers to revive the nuclear 
industry elsewhere in the world 
going to be observed here as well? 
Nuclear Power: World Outlook
As of 2010, 436 nuclear reactors 
generated about 15% of the world’s 
electricity. Hydraulic power, the 
other major low-emissions energy 
source, provided nearly 20%. But 
while hydraulic power is constrained 
by the availability of large rivers 
and depends on climate, nuclear 
power still has considerable room 
for growth. After a modest start in 
the 1950s and exponential growth 
in the 60s, the nuclear industry 
stagnated for 30 years in the western 
world, primarily as a result of the 
increase in interest rates caused by 
the 1973 oil crisis. 
During the stagnation period, 
the nuclear industry developed 
progressively simpler, safer and 
more robust reactors. Streamlined 
procedures improved performance, 
helped boost load factors from 60% 
to 90%, and extended service life by 
about 30%. Since the first reactor 
that produced enough power for four 
light bulbs in 1951, the technology 
has come a long way. Nowadays, the 
nuclear industry is probably the safest 
(fewer accidents per MW generated); 
most reliable (load factors above 
90%); economically attractive, even 
including decommissioning and 
waste management (comparable with 
coal-burning); and environmentally 
friendly (tiny CO2 footprint) energy 
source.
The last decade has witnessed 
a revival of the nuclear industry 
driven by increasing demand for 
energy.  In a context of uncertainty 
in oil prices and supplies, especially 
in the emerging economies, and 
concerns over greenhouse gas 
emissions, the supply security of 
nuclear power has made it more 
attractive. This has led to a rebound 
in construction, especially in 
East Asia, and prompted several 
European governments to revise 
their nuclear policies. China 
and India plan to increase their 
nuclear capacity by some 100,000 
megawatts by 2020, and the US 
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
has received applications for 30 new 
nuclear reactors to go online in the 
next decade. 
A new concern is global warming, 
presumably an effect of burning 
fossil fuels, which in a few decades 
returns to the atmosphere the CO2 
that was captured by plants over 
several hundred million years. Even 
some environmentalists formerly 
opposed to nuclear power advocate 
the use of nuclear technology to 
eliminate fossil fuels from electric 
generation worldwide. If the 
growing trend is maintained, nuclear 
power could be generating more 
than 20% of the world’s electricity 
in 20 years.
Latin America’s Nuclear Countries
Argentina and Brazil, like other 
world powers after World War II, 
developed nuclear energy as an 
outgrowth of military programs in 
the 1950s. Nuclear programs in 
these South American countries 
were sparked by the hegemonic 
ambitions of the authoritarian, 
nationalistic governments headed 
by strongmen Juan Domingo Perón 
and Getúlio Vargas, respectively. In 
the 1970s, military regimes in both 
countries covertly attempted to 
develop missiles and to master the 
complete nuclear fuel cycle. Although 
their civilian nuclear industries 
did not require it, both succeeded 
in controlling the heavy water 
enrichment and production cycle. 
Nuclear electricity was essentially a 
cover for military programs rather 
than a true attempt to secure the 
energy supply. With the return to 
democracy, both Argentina and 
Brazil abandoned their military goals, 
developing civilian nuclear power 
programs that have safely and reliably 
delivered 935MWe and 1,900MWe 
to their respective grids. 
Mexico, in contrast, never started 
a military nuclear effort. In the early 
1960s the government concluded 
that, at prevailing uranium prices, 
it made sense to sell oil abroad and 
import nuclear fuel rather than 
burn oil to produce electricity. 
This led to the construction of 
the Laguna Verde Plant in 1988, 
which has successfully provided 
some 1,330MWe to the Mexican 
economy.
The 5,300 MW of nuclear 
generation in these three countries 
covers about 5% of their internal 
demand and accounts for 2% 
of Latin American electricity 
generation. Argentina and Brazil are 
completing construction of third 
reactors (Atucha II and Angra III, 
respectively). Mexico is expanding 
the capacity of its Laguna Verde 
facility by 20% and is considering 
construction of eight new reactors 
as part of plans to reduce its carbon 
footprint. This vigorous growth, 
which could triple output by 
2025, has wide political support, 
a big change from the opposition 
the original plant encountered in 
the1980s.
New Concerns, New Players 
In recent years, several Latin 
American governments have 
expressed interest in starting new 
nuclear programs. Apart from 
Cuba, however, where efforts in 
this direction were started and then 
aborted, no new programs have been 
launched since the 1980s. After so 
many unfulfilled announcements, 
and the abundance of hydraulic and 
fossil fuel resources in the region, 
those claims can reasonably be 
dismissed as sheer advertising for 
image-building, without a serious 
commitment.
Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico, 
Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and 
Bolivia are rich in fossil fuels; Brazil 
has vast untapped hydroelectric 
potential; Paraguay exports five 
times the electricity it consumes; 
and, until recently, Argentina 
had a natural gas surplus. Such 
abundance makes nuclear energy 
unattractive as a short- or medium-
term option. However, as economic 
growth forces up demand and fuel 
prices, as CO2 emissions become 
increasingly objectionable and 
eventually taxed, and fewer rivers 
remain untapped, burning fossil 
fuels for electric generation will 
become uneconomical, unpopular 
and unethical. Sooner or later, 
Latin American economies will 
have to look for alternatives that 
can provide base-load electricity 
safely, reliably, affordably and 
sustainably to replace today’s 
primary sources: hydropower, coal 
and gas. Renewables – wind, solar 
and geothermal – are intermittent, 
considerably more expensive and less 
reliable than the standard primary 
sources and, contrary to standard 
opinion, not as environmentally 
friendly with current technology. 
Scale is also an issue: It takes 
around 20,000 acres of wind 
turbines to match the output of 
a standard coal-burning plant. As 
energy–storing technology evolves, 
some nonconventional alternatives 
should play an important role in 
the future matrix, but which ones 
and when remain open questions. 
Since the only certain fact about 
the future is the growing need for 
energy, countries with limited energy 
resources that could jeopardize their 
economic future would be wise to 
invest in a proven technology such as 
nuclear, which could deliver energy 
to the required scale at a reasonable 
cost and in reasonable time.
Chile and Uruguay are seriously 
considering nuclear power as an 
alternative. These two countries are 
net energy importers, with limited 
fossil fuel deposits and little room 
for growth in hydropower. They 
seem the most likely candidates 
to join the regional nuclear club. 
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Reaching this goal, however, is 
a complex affair for any nation, 
hinging on unpredictable factors 
and internal and external political 
barriers that must be overcome. 
Challenges and Opportunities
Countries that intend to start 
civilian nuclear power programs 
must not only have the financial 
resources to invest in the technology, 
but must also be technologically 
sophisticated and institutionally 
mature, with the necessary legal and 
regulatory government agencies. 
These nations should also have a 
safety culture that goes beyond 
having enough manpower to operate 
nuclear reactors, a regulatory 
body and a minimal technological 
network to support the nuclear 
industry. They must have the human 
resources trained for high standards 
of safety and rigor. 
Civilian nuclear power programs 
require broad social consensus. 
Both imaginary fears and legitimate 
concerns about nuclear energy 
must be addressed, and the long-
term commitments cannot be 
overlooked. The first power that 
nuclear reactors generate brings with 
it irradiated fuel containing high-
activity, long half-life radionuclides 
that must be kept in isolation for 
several centuries. Although this 
is not technologically difficult to 
do, it underscores the fact that 
starting a nuclear power program 
requires having answers to questions 
that might arise a hundred years 
down the road. In participatory 
democracies, this requires a 
high level of public consensus 
and governments that guarantee 
transparency, thoroughness and 
best practices through competent, 
rigorous, independent and fully 
empowered regulatory agencies.
Nuclear countries must also 
satisfy the international community 
with a clear commitment to 
peace. All Latin American and 
Caribbean countries have ratified 
the Tlatelolco and Nuclear Non-
Proliferation treaties, but recent 
ambiguous statements by Brazilian 
authorities with regard to the 
legitimacy of the military use of 
nuclear energy have cast a shadow 
over the civilian nature of that 
country’s program. Venezuela’s 
plans to join Iran’s nuclear efforts 
have also raised concerns in the 
international community. Although 
there are no signs that Venezuela 
has the technological knowhow or 
the intention to become a rogue 
state like North Korea, it is still a 
matter of concern that Venezuela, 
Brazil and Argentina have yet to 
endorse the Additional Safeguards 
Protocol to allow unimpeded 
nuclear inspections. 
Recurring international concerns 
about terrorist groups getting hold 
of fissile material to make weapons, 
or spent fuel and other radioactive 
material to produce “dirty bombs,” 
are exaggerated given the enormous 
technological difficulties involved in 
building a working nuclear bomb 
and the inefficiency of a dirty bomb 
as terrorist propaganda. 
Regional integration is probably 
the key to ensuring viable, robust 
and transparent nuclear programs. 
International cooperation could help 
newcomers establish their regulatory 
infrastructures. The industry could 
benefit from an extensive network 
of advanced technology providers, 
with training and certification of 
operators and inspectors carried 
out at regional centers. Integration 
could also provide assurances to 
all stakeholders of compliance 
with non-proliferation agreements 
and avoidance of the military 
use of nuclear power, similar to 
the ABAAC agreement between 
Argentina and Brazil for the 
enrichment of uranium. Electrical 
integration of the region, like the 
SIEPAC project in Central America 
or similar efforts in the Southern 
Cone, would make the grids more 
stable, economically efficient and 
robust under local or seasonal 
climate fluctuations. Finally, an 
integrated Latin American nuclear 
energy effort could play a role 
similar to that of EURATOM, 
which started the European 
economic integration that gave rise 
to the EEC 40 years later.
The recent earthquake and 
tsunami that struck Japan have 
raised legitimate concerns about the 
safety of the nuclear industry. The 
accident at the Fukushima power 
plant prompted antinuclear voices 
demanding the suspension of new 
reactor construction and possibly 
reducing existing nuclear generation. 
Although it is too soon to tell 
whether human responsibilities 
contributed to the magnitude of the 
accident, the lessons learned from 
this experience will be incorporated 
into the next generation of nuclear 
reactors, significantly improving the 
safety and reliability of the nuclear 
industry, in an evolution similar to 
that of the aviation industry. The 
nuclear industry will certainly suffer 
in the short term as governments 
and investors revise their plans 
and the technology absorbs the 
lessons learned. As the dust settles 
in a scenario of increasing energy 
demands, however, renewed growth 
can be expected. The image of 
nuclear energy will suffer in the 
eyes of the public, but its safety 
record will not change much from 
its historical level, keeping it one of 
the safest and most environmentally 
friendly forms of electric 
generation. ■
Jorge Zanelli Iglesias is a researcher 
at the Centro de Estudios Científicos 
(CES) in Valdivia, Chile. This is a 
condensed and updated version of a 
longer article.
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R E P O R T S
What Climate Change Means  
for Latin America
By Paul Isbell
L atin America’s position in the energy and climate change landscape generates unique strategic policy choices. 
Like Africa, Latin America has 
contributed relatively little to climate 
change, but the region is set to 
absorb more than its fair share of 
the environmental and geopolitical 
consequences of the problem, leading 
to a range of strategic incentives 
and disincentives that require more 
than mere replication of the policy 
responses elsewhere.
Latin America is particularly 
vulnerable to climate change due 
to its geography. Much of Mexico 
and Central America lies within the 
hurricane belt, which now operates 
with greater force and volatility as 
a result of global warming. Latin 
America’s low-lying coastal zones, 
which include many of the region’s 
largest urban areas, will come under 
threat from warming-induced 
rising sea levels. In addition, much 
of South America’s agriculture 
and urban activity depends on 
water flowing from the Andean 
glaciers, which are now in retreat. 
This threatens the sustainability 
of the region’s populations and 
economies and, in particular, its 
main low-carbon energy source – 
hydroelectric power. 
How such environmental 
instability will interact with ongoing 
geopolitical frictions and heightened 
instability in different parts of the 
region is far from clear. Climate 
change is poised to impact Latin 
America just as many of the region’s 
economies are breaking away from 
a traditional cyclical dependency 
on the world’s core developed 
economies. The region’s economies 
are slowly but surely diversifying 
their domestic production, internal 
demand, and external trade 
and financial linkages. Brazil in 
Compared to the US or China, each of which contributes 20% of the world’s annual greenhouse gas emissions, Latin America accounts for a mere 
10%. Agriculture (a major source of methane) and deforestation account for nearly two-thirds of the region’s greenhouse gases.
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particular is emerging as a pioneer 
in energy and climate policy. At 
the same time, however, the region 
remains vulnerable to traditional 
maladies – from the oil curse to the 
debt trap – that typically interact 
destructively with the sources and 
impacts of human-induced climate 
change. 
Compared to the United States 
or China, each of which contributes 
more than 20% of the world’s 
annual greenhouse gas emissions, 
Latin America’s impact is a mere 
10%. In per capita terms, these 
figures correspond to more than 23 
metric tons per person in the US, 
compared to just over 10 metric 
tons in Latin America. This is down 
from more than 13 metric tons 20 
years ago. 
Furthermore, Latin America’s 
carbon footprint has a distinctive 
structure and obeys a different 
dynamic than in other parts of 
the world. While CO2 emissions 
from energy use make up nearly 
two-thirds of global greenhouse gas 
released from all sources, in Latin 
America they account for less than a 
third. Instead, agriculture (a major 
source of methane) and changes 
in land use patterns, including 
livestock-driven deforestation, 
account for nearly two-thirds of 
the greenhouse gases the region 
produces.
If we removed all greenhouse 
gas contributions stemming from 
changes in land use patterns, 
the region’s share would drop to 
around 6% (around 5 metric tons 
per capita). The US contribution 
in relative terms would remain at 
more than 20% (22 metric tons 
per capita). But if we discounted 
all non-energy related greenhouse 
gas emissions, Latin America’s 
contribution would fall even further, 
to between 3 and 4% of the global 
total (compared to 19% from the 
US), around four to five metric 
tons per capita. This is in line with 
Chinese per capita energy-induced 
CO2 emissions.
What this emissions profile 
should tell policymakers about 
Latin America is that energy 
consumption there is less dirty (in 
climate terms) than in most other 
parts of the world. Although Latin 
America is still more dependent 
on petroleum, which comprises 
44% of its energy mix compared 
to 35% in the world as a whole, 
it is less dependent on coal (4% 
compared to a global average of 
24%). Coal is by far the energy 
source that emits the most CO2. In 
its place, Latin America relies on 
large-scale hydroelectric power for 
approximately 25% of the region’s 
primary energy mix. In Brazil, 
the figure is 75%, an even greater 
electricity share than France’s fabled 
nuclear power, while in Paraguay 
hydropower approaches 100% of 
the electricity mix. 
For policymakers, the battle 
against deforestation is even more 
important than decarbonization 
of the energy economy in Latin 
America. This is particularly true 
in Brazil, where biofuels add even 
more low-carbon energy – 25% of 
all transportation fuels – on top of 
hydroelectricity. But while Brazil’s 
energy economy is relatively clean 
in terms of carbon emissions, its 
economy accounts for much of 
the significantly higher level of 
greenhouse gas emissions in the 
region in total.
To some observers, all of this 
suggests that the push toward 
a post-fossil fuel energy future 
is less urgent in Latin America 
than in other parts of the world. 
On the one hand, given the low 
level of CO2 emissions stemming 
from energy across the region, 
even if Latin America completely 
decarbonizes its energy economy 
it will make little difference to 
the rate of global greenhouse gas 
accumulation in the atmosphere 
(the key in this regard resides 
in the US and in China). The 
expansion of livestock agriculture, 
on the other hand, which leads to 
both increased methane emissions 
and forest clearing-induced 
CO2 accumulation, significantly 
contributes to global warming. 
Efforts to halt deforestation in 
developing countries, such as 
the REDD+ program, have been 
recognized by the international 
climate change community as 
critical elements in the fight against 
global warming. Unfortunately, 
while Latin America has improved 
on the land-use front, its 
traditionally low energy-induced 
carbon dioxide emissions have 
increased significantly in recent 
years, even if from a low base. 
Some Latin American countries 
may see little strategic gain in 
undertaking the arduous and 
costly effort of deploying low-
carbon energies to reduce global 
emissions in time to avoid the worst 
manifestations of climate change. 
Yet many of the same countries 
have much to gain from significant 
efforts to pursue low-carbon energy 
deployment, simply because such a 
commitment is often the best way 
to garner financing for the costly 
mitigation efforts and even more 
expensive climate adaptation they 
will soon need. Even without the 
threat of climate change, many 
Latin American countries would see 
strategic benefits from displacing 
imported, high-priced fossil fuels 
with domestic renewable and 
other low-carbon energy sources, 
reducing direct energy costs and 
freeing themselves from potentially 
destabilizing dependence on 
unstable and unreliable sources. ■
Paul Isbell is a visiting senior fellow 
at the Inter-American Dialogue.
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Central America’s Energy  
Challenges
By Cristina Eguizábal
Of the three poorest countries in the Americas, two are in Central America. With 
the exception of Costa Rica and 
Panama, poverty rates are high and 
inequality is profound. Central 
American countries spend much 
of their resources on imported 
hydrocarbons despite the fact 
that the region’s main source of 
energy for household use remains 
firewood. This is even true of Belize 
and Guatemala, the region’s only 
oil producers. As a result, the seven 
small economies of the region suffer 
when oil prices are high, as was the 
case in 2008. 
Hydroelectricity, administered 
by the state through public utilities 
and transmission companies, has 
dominated electricity generation in 
the region. In the 1990s, economic 
liberalization and privatization 
reached the energy markets 
and attracted foreign investors 
to develop new power plants. 
Investors preferred thermal (diesel-
powered) plants as they were less 
costly and faster to build than 
hydropower plants, let alone river 
dams. In the 1980s, approximately 
75% of the region’s energy came 
from hydroelectric dams; that 
percentage has since dropped to 
less than 50%.  In 2009, according 
to ECLAC, 47.5% of electricity 
in Central America was generated 
by hydraulic power, 37.3% came 
from oil, 7.9% was geothermal, 
4.4% was generated by sugar cane, 
1.8% came from coal and 1% 
was wind-powered. Of that total, 
60.8% of electricity was generated 
from renewable sources. As a result, 
the region’s energy matrix looks 
fairly diversified, although much 
work remains to be done for the 
countries to reach energy output 
levels capable of maintaining 
economic growth and lifting their 
Guatemalan woman carrying a load of firewood from the slopes of the mountain to her home. In the 
Quiche region, more than 90 percent of families rely on firewood for cooking.
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Windmill farm on the shores of Lake Nicaragua. The Concepción Volcano on Ometepe Island dominates the background.
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populations up from poverty 
while reducing the proportion of 
hydrocarbon-generated electricity. 
Energy profiles vary among 
Central American countries: 95% 
of Costa Rica’s energy production 
comes from renewable sources 
(mostly river dams), while in 
Nicaragua the figure is 26.6%. In 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama 
and Honduras the proportion of 
renewable energy is around 50%. All 
of the countries in the region need 
to expand their power-generating 
capacity quickly to extend the 
electrical grid to rural areas and 
complete the electrification of 
their territory. Out of a total of 40 
million people living in Central 
America, approximately 10 million 
do not have electricity in their 
homes and almost 20 million still 
use firewood for cooking. The 
challenge confronting Central 
American countries is their need 
to reduce reliance on traditional 
biomass sources of energy –e.g., 
firewood—which are not only big 
polluters but also contribute to 
the region’s rapid deforestation. It 
is imperative to build renewable 
energy-generating capacity while 
reducing emissions of greenhouse-
effect gases.
Central America’s hydroelectric 
potential is far from exhausted. Big 
dams are not only costly in financial 
terms, however; by dramatically 
changing the social and ecological 
systems of an entire region, they can 
also become costly politically. The 
Brazilian conglomerate Quieroz-
Galvão-Electrobras is building a 
new dam, Tumarín, in Nicaragua’s 
South Atlantic Autonomous 
region. The dam will revert to 
public property after 30 years, but 
the communities that surround 
Tumarín –which claim they were 
not consulted about the project—
and environmentalist groups allege 
that it will negatively impact the 
entire Río Grande de Matagalpa 
watershed. 
The Chalillo hydropower project 
in Belize provides another example. 
Since 2005, Belize Sugar Industries 
(BSI) has been working on a plant 
that runs on both oil and sugar cane 
bagasse (92% renewable). It will 
produce 30 megawatts of power, of 
which 25 megawatts, representing 
20% of Belize’s national grid, are to 
be sold directly to the state-owned 
Belize Electricity Limited. The 
remaining five will be for use at the 
BSI factory. 
Other renewable public-private 
partnerships in energy projects 
include wind parks in Costa Rica 
(Plantas Eólicas de Costa Rica) 
and Nicaragua (Amayo I and II), 
which are already operational, and 
Cerro de Hula in Honduras, still 
under construction. El Salvador is 
Central America’s larger producer 
of geothermal energy. Two plants 
in Ahuachapán and Berlín generate 
approximately one-quarter of the 
country’s total output. 
At the other end of the continuum 
are small-scale renewable energy 
initiatives that allow poor rural 
populations to avoid the need for 
fixed lines. There are no reliable data 
on the spread of off-grid renewable 
energy on a small scale, but a large 
number of these systems are being 
installed. Small solar projects, 
underground biogas chambers and 
“mini” hydroelectric dams deliver 
electricity at a price that even the 
poor can afford and are sufficient to 
power cell phones, fans and high-
efficiency light bulbs. These initiatives 
will not replace the need for the more 
reliable electricity delivery systems 
necessary to power major appliances 
such as refrigerators, but until that 
happens, they will make life easier for 
millions of people, particularly poor 
women and children. 
The most ambitious energy 
initiative involves not power 
generation but power efficiency, by 
linking the power grids of Panama, 
Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, 
El Salvador and Guatemala. 
After 20 years of discussion, 
Central American governments 
finally began construction of the 
Central American Interconnection 
System (SIEPAC) in 2006; the 
interconnection of Panama and 
Costa Rica became operational 
on October 25, 2010. As 
part of the Puebla Panama 
development initiative (which 
includes Colombia as well), the 
Regional Electrical Market plans 
to complement SIEPAC with 
electrical interconnections between 
Guatemala and Mexico, Guatemala 
and Belize, and Panama and 
Colombia. Supporters of the project 
argue that the interconnection of 
the nations’ electrical transmission 
grids will optimize shared use of 
hydroelectricity, reduce operating 
costs and create a large enough 
market to attract foreign investment 
in power generation and transmission 
systems. Some critics fear that 
SIEPAC will facilitate electricity 
exports to Mexico and Colombia 
but not expand access in Central 
America, and others voice concerns 
about the associated environmental 
and social costs of large hydropower 
facilities. Supporters and critics alike 
stress the weakness of the region’s 
regulatory environment at all levels, 
national and regional. 
Central American countries must 
expand their electricity generation 
considerably in the coming years. 
To do so responsibly, they need 
to establish a truly diverse energy 
pattern based on financial and 
environmental sustainability. ■
Cristina Eguizábal is a professor 
of international relations and the 
director of the Latin American 
and Caribbean Center at Florida 
International University.
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Why the United States and  
Cuba Collaborate 
(and What Could Happen If They Don’t)
By Jorge Piñón
I
f Cuba’s suspected but yet 
undiscovered hydrocarbon 
reserves are proven real, it will 
take between three and five 
years to develop them fully. 
Production volumes would have to 
reach more than 200,000 barrels 
per day to have the same positive 
economic impact currently derived 
from foreign oil subsidies. If this 
occurs, significant revenues from oil, 
natural gas and sugarcane ethanol 
would integrate Cuba into global 
and regional markets within the next 
five years. 
International oil companies such 
as Spain’s Repsol, Norway’s Statoil 
Norsk Hydro and Brazil’s Petrobras 
are actively exploring Cuba’s 
Gulf of Mexico waters. Cuban 
authorities have invited United 
States oil companies to participate 
in developing the island’s offshore 
oil and natural gas resources, 
but US law does not allow this. 
Although US oil, oil equipment and 
service companies have the capital, 
technology and operational know-
how to explore, produce and refine 
Cuba’s potential reserves in a safe 
and responsible manner, the almost 
five-decade old unilateral political 
and economic embargo keeps them 
on the sidelines.
Cuba currently relies on heavily 
subsidized oil from Venezuela for 
two-thirds of its petroleum needs. 
This supply contributes to the 
Cuban government’s ability to 
maintain a politically antagonistic 
and belligerent position towards 
the US. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union 
in 1991 made Cuba aware of the 
political and economic risks and 
consequences of depending on a 
single source of imported oil. Only 
when Cuba diversifies suppliers and 
develops its offshore hydrocarbon 
resources, estimated by the United 
States Geological Survey at 5.5 
million barrels of oil and 9.8 trillion 
cubic feet of natural gas, will it 
have the economic independence 
to consider political and economic 
reforms. It is in the US interest 
to develop a new policy toward 
the island based on constructive 
engagement to support the 
emergence of a Cuban state in which 
Cubans themselves can determine the 
political and economic future of their 
country through democratic means.
Cuba is about to embark on an 
18-month oil exploration drilling 
program to validate the presence of 
recoverable hydrocarbon reserves. 
US support of such endeavors would 
be beneficial in the framework of a 
constructive engagement policy. 
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The Deepwater Horizon drilling 
semi-submersible incident and 
the resulting catastrophic oil 
spill demonstrate the urgency of 
developing a policy of energy and 
environmental cooperation between 
the United States and Cuba. As 
Cuba develops its deepwater oil 
and natural gas potential, the 
possible consequences of a spill 
call for proactive planning by both 
countries to minimize or avoid an 
environmental disaster.
To respond effectively to an 
oil-related marine accident, any 
company operating in Cuba would 
require immediate access to US oil 
services companies for the near-
instant technology and know-how 
needed to halt and limit damage to 
the marine environment. Obviously, 
the establishment of working 
relations between the US and Cuba 
in the area of marine environmental 
protection would assist enormously 
in the contingency planning and 
cooperation necessary for an early 
and effective response to an oil spill.
The United States and Cuba 
are already parties to a number of 
multilateral oil pollution agreements, 
such as the 1973 International 
Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) 
and the 1983 Convention for the 
protection and Development of 
the Marine Environment in the 
Wider Caribbean Region (Cartagena 
Convention). Both agreements 
address prevention of pollution of 
the marine environment by ships 
from operational or accidental 
causes. The 1990 International 
Convention on Oil Pollution 
Preparedness, Response and 
Cooperation also offers a precedent 
for cooperation. The convention 
is designed to encourage and 
facilitate international cooperation 
and mutual assistance in preparing 
for and responding to major oil 
pollution incidents. Signatory 
nations are tasked with developing 
and maintaining adequate 
capabilities to deal with such an 
emergency. In the case of Cuba and 
the United States, the capabilities 
must be transnational, as there is no 
barrier to the movement of oil from 
one country’s waters to another’s. 
The United States, therefore, must 
develop appropriate regulatory and 
procedural frameworks for the free 
movement of equipment, personnel 
and expertise between the two 
countries as part of any oil spill 
response. 
The 1980 Agreement of 
Cooperation between the United 
States and Mexico Regarding 
Pollution of the Marine 
Environment by Discharges of 
Hydrocarbons and Other Hazardous 
Substances (MEXUS Plan) provides 
the foundation for a similar protocol 
with Cuba. This would include 
the establishment of joint response 
teams, coordinating roles, rapid 
incident notification mechanisms, 
joint operations centers and 
communication procedures, along 
with regular exercises and meetings. 
The United States government, 
irrespective of the current embargo, 
has the power to license the sale, 
lease or loan of emergency relief and 
reconstruction equipment and the 
travel of expert personnel to Cuba 
following an oil spill. 
Cuba’s long-term energy 
challenges will be a consequence 
of its future economic growth and 
rising standard of living within 
a market environment. This 
anticipated growth will depend 
largely on the development of 
a competitively priced, readily 
available and environmentally sound 
long-term energy plan. Cuban 
energy policy should embrace 
energy conservation, modernization 
of the energy infrastructure, and 
balance in sourcing oil/gas supplies 
and renewable energy sources that 
protect the island’s environment. 
The country would benefit from the 
guidance of a variety of partners, 
including the United States. ■
Jorge R. Piñón is a visiting research 
fellow at the Latin American and 
Caribbean Center’s Cuban Research 
Institute at FIU. The opinions 
expressed in this paper are among 
the recommendations resulting from 
the Brookings Institute April 2010 
seminar, “U.S. Policy toward a Cuba 
in Transition.”
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Challenges of Designing an 
Optimal Petroleum Fiscal Model 
in Latin America
By Roger Tissot
T
he ability to replace 
hydrocarbon reserves 
is influenced by the 
level of investment in 
exploration activities. 
Governments have two options for 
conducting exploration activity: 1) 
investing in exploration activities 
directly; or 2) asking private 
companies to make the investments. 
In the first case, the ability of 
the entity – usually the National 
Oil Company (NOC) – to make 
investments depends on the skill 
level of the country’s workforce, the 
government’s financial capabilities, 
its aversion to risk, and the level of 
financial and strategic independence 
of the NOC from other government 
authorities. 
Political authorities tend to 
be risk averse and would prefer 
to use scarce financial resources 
for projects aimed at improving 
social conditions or economic 
development. Their investment 
preferences are also influenced 
by political ideology and the 
preferences of their constituencies. 
The NOC has to compete with 
other government authorities for the 
funding to make its investments. 
The more dependent on NOC 
revenues the government is, the less 
independence will be granted to the 
NOC. In this case, the NOC is more 
likely to be risk averse, focus most 
investments on sustaining production 
from existing wells, and implement 
only modest exploration activities in 
the most prospective areas. 
Sometimes NOCs manage to 
achieve a high level of independence 
from the government despite 
being their main source of cash. 
The sustainability of NOC 
“independence” depends upon 
three factors: 1) its ability to meet 
the government’s financial needs; 
2) its capacity to produce and 
replace reserves efficiently; and 3) 
endorsement of NOC strategic 
activities by top-level political 
authorities. If these conditions are 
not met, the result is often a cash-
starved and risk-averse NOC unable 
to carry out exploration alone. 
The other option is for 
governments to offer the rights 
for developing the resource via 
concessions to international oil 
companies (IOCs), or to partner 
with them in exchange for a share 
of production or profits. The 
option selected depends on the 
government’s choice of petroleum 
fiscal models. 
The different “families” of 
models represent legal contracts 
or agreements covering rights 
granted over a period of time and 
for an agreed level of activity. The 
difference between these systems 
mostly involves the mechanics of 
risk and reward sharing between 
the contractor and the government. 
Fiscal models can be more or less 
progressive depending on when 
the rents are captured: the later 
the payment is required, the more 
progressive the system is. 
The main challenge in the 
design of optimal fiscal system is 
to achieve alignment of different 
and sometimes diverging objectives 
between the government and the 
IOC. The government’s primary 
objective is to maximize the value 
of its petroleum resources while 
attracting sufficient interest from 
IOCs to invest in E&P activities. 
IOCs in turn seek to ensure that 
the rate of return on the capital 
employed is consistent with the 
project’s risk and with the strategic 
objectives of the corporation.
Latin American Experience
Latin America has been a fertile 
ground for petroleum fiscal models. 
Whether the region’s policies are 
open or closed usually obeys shifts 
in the political pendulum from 
populism to economic orthodoxy. 
In the 1990s, therefore, Latin 
America adopted market-oriented 
models, reduced government take, 
ended NOC monopolies and, 
in some cases, privatized them. 
The private sector response was 
positive, resulting in rapid growth 
of reserves and production. Most of 
the fiscal models, however, failed to 
respond to the steep price increases. 
That failure coincided with the 
rise of new populist regimes that 
relied on resource nationalism as 
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a key component of their political 
platforms. 
Since this most recent “turn to 
the left,” Latin America has faced 
two very different paths with regard 
to oil policy. The first favors state 
corporatism and maximization of 
rents even at the cost of investments 
and additional reserves. This is the 
case of Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador 
and, to a certain degree, Brazil 
and Argentina. The second path 
advocates strengthening market-
oriented models, resulting in a 
boom in investments in Colombia, 
Peru and, to a lesser extent, Trinidad 
& Tobago. 
Oil Reserves and Production
Figure 1 shows the evolution 
of petroleum reserves in Latin 
America from the 1990s through 
2009. Reserves increased modestly 
(0.7% on average) from 1990 to 
2005, followed by a drastic jump 
since then.
Figure 2 shows the change in oil 
reserves in the main oil-producing 
countries of Latin America between 
2004 and 2009. Venezuela explains 
most of the jump in reserves over 
the last few years. This is not 
“new oil” but rather a change in 
the definition of already recorded 
reserves from the heavy crude oil 
Orinoco fields. Brazil has increased 
its reserves almost constantly in 
the last two decades, due in part 
to more active exploration efforts 
by Petrobras, the Brazilian NOC, 
and IOCs since the opening of the 
sector a decade ago. Brazil has also 
captured international headlines 
since 2008 due to huge discoveries 
of pre-salt oil, described as a “game 
changer” for Brazil’s petroleum 
outlook. The country is expected to 
become an important oil exporter in 
the next decade.
Latin America’s oil production 
peaked at 10.65 million b/d in 
2005. Since then, production has 
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slowly declined to less than 10 
million b/d. Average production 
changes since 2005 on a country 
basis show Mexico with the biggest 
decline, followed by Venezuela, 
Argentina and Ecuador. Gains were 
made in Brazil, Colombia and Peru.
Petroleum Policy Outlook 
According to a recent report by 
the Fitch Rating agency, capital 
expenditures by the largest five 
Latin American NOCs could reach 
US$550 bn in the next five years. 
Coinciding with the ambitious 
expansion plans is a deterioration 
of fiscal balances in the region due 
to increased spending caused by 
the fiscal stimulus in 2009 and 
natural disasters during the 2010 
rainy season.
Countries that were seen as 
“business friendly” have become 
victims of their own success. Access 
to land is becoming more expensive 
and governments have imposed 
higher taxes and royalties and/or 
stricter qualifying requirements 
for IOCs. Resource-nationalist 
countries have experienced a drastic 
decline in production and, in 
some cases, reserves. The economic 
sustainability of these countries 
is tied to new investments. There 
is uncertainty about local NOCs’ 
abilities to meet the investment 
challenge, while foreign investors 
would expect a reward attractive 
enough to compensate for political 
and fiscal risks.
In the last decade, some 
countries have successfully 
increased their hydrocarbon 
reserves, with high rents for 
governments, increased investment 
and attractive rates of return for 
investors. It would be tempting 
to “copy” the fiscal models 
of successful countries, but a 
successful fiscal model must reflect 
the political, social and economic 
characteristics of the host country. 
In some countries, allowing 
concessions to IOCs may be seen 
as highly offensive, for historical 
reasons. In others, the need to 
secure new reserves to postpone 
the need to import oil is a 
sufficient incentive to grant IOCs 
attractive fiscal conditions. 
The main challenge in Latin 
America is to design petroleum 
fiscal models that are flexible 
enough to incorporate price 
volatility and political change and 
stable enough to allow private 
investors to focus on long-term 
development. ■
Roger Tissot is an economist and 
independent consultant focusing 
on Latin American energy policy, 
markets and strategy, advising mostly 
Canadian and international oil and 
gas companies.
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Petrobras: The Unique Structure 
behind Latin America’s Best 
Performing Oil Company
 Genaro Arriagada and Chris Cote
B
razil’s oil and gas 
giant Petrobras stands 
among the world’s most 
successful businesses, 
admired by the public as 
well as by private and state-owned 
national and transnational oil 
companies. Petrobras today is active 
in 23 countries in the exploration, 
production, refining, distribution 
and sale of oil, gas and energy, as 
well as petrochemicals, biofuels and 
electricity.
Latin America’s most successful 
oil company owes its success at 
least in part to Brazil’s condition 
as an oil-poor country with a 
government that does not see it as a 
cash cow. Unlike the other state-
owned powerhouses in the region, 
Mexico’s PEMEX and Venezuela’s 
PDVSA, Petrobras grew gradually 
on a reputation for efficiency, 
ensuring crucial funding from 
government and other sources. The 
recent discovery of pre-salt oil now 
presents the company with the 
opportunity to exploit immense 
new reserves. 
A Remarkable Success
After recovering quickly from 
the recent financial crisis, Petrobras 
is considered the world’s eighth 
largest corporation and is often 
described as Latin America’s best-
managed company.  
Brazil’s oil and natural gas 
production are rising: Oil production 
is projected to increase by 60% by Petrobras headquarters, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
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2014 and 130% by 2020 (compared 
to 2008). Natural gas production 
is estimated to increase by 100 and 
245%, respectively. Company reports 
estimate that in 2014 Petrobras 
will produce 3 million barrels of oil 
per day and 623,000 barrels of oil 
equivalent (boe) in natural gas. 
Petrobras’s investment is 
enormous. Its 2010-2014 Business 
Plan calls for an investment of $224 
billion (some $45 billion per year), 
more than five times the investment 
level of PDVSA, according to 
independent estimates. 
Petrobras’s efficiency compares 
exceedingly well to oil companies 
of similar size, although accurate 
comparisons are difficult as most 
similar sized national oil companies 
(NOCs) —the majority in the 
Persian Gulf—do not provide 
audited figures. Industry analysts 
believe that Petrobras vastly 
outperforms all of them. Petrobras 
also ranks exceptionally high when 
compared with the supermajors. 
Statists vs. Free Enterprisers
The history of Petrobras is rife 
with tension, largely between those 
who wanted a fully state-owned 
enterprise (“statists”) and those who 
envisioned Petrobras as a private 
company (“free enterprisers”). 
The Brazilian government 
cemented Petrobras’s status as a 
state institution with several laws 
between the 1940s and 1960s, and 
the Federal Constitution of 1988, 
which enacted a state monopoly 
over all aspects of the hydrocarbons 
industry, put Petrobras firmly in 
state hands. 
After several unsuccessful 
attempts in the early 1990s, reform 
proponents finally had some 
success under the presidency of 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso. A 
1995 Constitutional amendment 
authorized the federal government 
“to outsource oil and gas activities 
under state monopoly to private or 
government-owned companies.” 
Two years later, Congress set a 
new industry framework segregating 
Petrobras’s business and regulatory 
roles. Petrobras kept the former 
while the latter was transferred to 
a new National Petroleum Agency 
(ANP), effective in January 1998. 
The interaction between Petrobras 
and the ANP is among the keys to 
understanding the success of Brazil’s 
oil policy. 
The ANP’s ample powers include 
the awarding of exploration and 
production bids for oil, natural gas 
and other liquid fuel concessions; 
approving the import, export and 
transportation of natural gas, oil 
and its derivatives; and playing a 
regulatory, oversight and dispute-
settlement role in substantive 
cases. While maintaining a state 
monopoly on oil and gas, Brazil 
grants exploration and production 
concessions to Petrobras, private 
companies and joint efforts. In 
January 2002, the country also 
deregulated imports, exports and 
prices. 
A Very Special Government 
Corporation
The recurring conflict between 
statists and free enterprisers, which 
has never been fully resolved, is 
fundamental to understanding 
how Petrobras became a sui generis 
national oil company. Petrobras 
has dual status as a government 
corporation with a crucial role in 
Brazilian growth and as a dividend-
paying private company.
Private involvement in Petrobras 
would not have been possible 
without a legal framework 
guaranteeing government control. 
Brazil shares with many other 
countries a nationalistic concern 
about oil resources, especially with 
regard to selling into foreign hands. 
Rather than risk denationalization 
of the industry, Law 9478 of 1997 
ensured that private shareholders 
had practically no non-economic 
rights, especially over management 
function, by separating stock 
into voting common shares and 
non-voting preferred shares. It 
also required state ownership of 
50%-plus-one of voting shares. A 
complementary 1999 law extended 
the possibility of stock ownership 
to foreign companies and 
individuals. Foreign-owned stock 
now exceeds the share in private 
Brazilian hands.  
State Business
A nine-member board of 
directors heads Petrobras. Seven 
members are government-
appointed, one represents non-
government minority common 
shareholders, and another is elected 
by preferred shareholders. The 
board is made up of cabinet-level 
officials (President Dilma Rousseff 
was previously a member), former 
military officials and academics, 
all with close or direct ruling party 
ties. One responsibility of the CEO 
is to propose a slate of six general 
managers for board approval or 
rejection. Along with the CEO, 
these general managers make up 
the executive board that runs the 
company. All board members 
except the CEO have had at least 
30 years of experience in Petrobras. 
Petrobras works closely with 
Congress and the administration. 
State oversight is exercised through 
legislative approval of multi-
year plans that establish general 
company goals and budgetary 
and investment guidelines. The 
plan helps entrench in law a 
medium-term budget timeframe 
free from Finance Ministry fiat. 
Petrobras operational, economic and 
government policy are harmonized 
through executive approval of a 
Global Expense Program.
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Private Investment and Oversight
Private ownership in Petrobras has 
expanded dramatically in the last 
decade. The number of shareholders 
grew by 153,000 between 2000 
and 2008, and today one million 
individuals hold shares in Petrobras-
related securities. 
Privatization proponents often 
claim that companies are more 
efficient and profitable in private 
hands. Petrobras has performed 
outstandingly in state hands while 
keeping the private sector in the role 
of a mere investor. Placing stock 
in private hands, however, had a 
fundamental effect on efficiency. It 
made Petrobras subject to the same 
oversight standards that apply to 
private multinationals, including the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, with audits and 
oversight conducted by a securities 
commission. The presence of private 
shareholders also serves as a check 
on government attempts to milk 
NOCs for cash. 
Opportunities and Challenges in 
Pre-Salt
When the pre-salt oil reserves—
estimated to contain 50 billion 
boe—were discovered off Brazil’s 
southeast coast in 2006 and 2007, 
the Lula administration quickly 
moved to bring the oil under more 
direct state control. The government 
passed four laws in 2010 that 
effectively limit foreign participation 
and guarantee Petrobras a majority 
hand in production.   
The first law created a new, state-
owned company, Pré-Sal Petróleo 
S.A. (PPSA), to manage pre-salt 
production sharing contracts 
entered into by the Ministry of 
Mines and Energy. The second 
authorized the government to 
cede Petrobras exploration and 
production rights to the equivalent 
of 5 billion boe in the pre-salt 
in exchange for a company share 
package whose value is set by law. 
The third made Petrobras the 
sole operator of pre-salt projects 
and gave it a 30% minimum 
stake in each. Finally, the fourth 
law created a social fund that 
will invest pre-salt profits in 
education, anti-poverty initiatives, 
the environment, science and 
technology.  
This legislation—especially 
Petrobras’s required operatorship in 
each project—presents an enormous 
opportunity to increase production 
levels over the next decade, but 
it also demands of Petrobras a 
high level of capitalization, skilled 
labor and management, technical 
expertise and efficiency. While 
Petrobras is widely considered to 
be capable and experienced enough 
to tackle the pre-salt, the amount 
of new production projects coming 
online will test the company’s 
human resource capacity and could 
undermine the sound management 
and organization that have brought 
it success up to this point. Critics 
of greater state control over the 
pre-salt are also concerned about the 
loss of competition and resulting 
inefficiencies that may arise. 
These obstacles notwithstanding, 
Petrobras is well positioned to 
take on the pre-salt projects. Its 
investment is on the rise, and capital 
inflows are increasing from foreign 
and domestic sources. The technical 
challenges are surmountable and will 
give the company greater experience 
in ultra-deepwater fields, cementing 
its position as the most successful 
and experienced deepwater driller. 
Brazil is already self-sufficient in 
oil production and consumption. 
When all of the pre-salt projects 
come online—probably around 
2020—Petrobras should become a 
major oil exporter. ■
Genaro Arriagada is a non-resident 
senior fellow and Chris Cote is a 
program assistant for economics at the 
Inter-American Dialogue.
Oil drilling platform off the coast of Brazil.
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Argentina’s Energy Pricing  
Challenges
By Pablo Fernández-Lamela
A
rgentina’s most 
immediate energy 
challenge is 
pricing—a situation 
it has in common to 
varying degrees with many other 
Latin American countries. Since 
2002, the Argentine government 
has capped the price of oil, gas 
and electricity substantially 
below market levels. The result 
has been a sharp drop in energy 
investments, rising consumer 
demand and growing subsidies. 
The government has taken some 
measures to address the situation 
but the central problem persists: 
To attract investment, reduce 
wasteful consumption and increase 
hydrocarbon reserves, Argentina 
needs to let markets determine 
most energy prices.
For the past two decades, 
Argentina has been a net energy 
exporter, but low prices, declining 
production and rising domestic 
demand have brought the country 
close to becoming a net energy 
importer. Oil output decreased by 
27% between 1998 and 2010, and 
gas production has declined by 10% 
since 2004. Oil exports dropped 
by 64% from 2001 to 2009; gas 
exports plummeted by 88% from 
2004 to 2009. Proven reserves of oil 
declined 22% in the last 10 years 
and gas reserves have fallen by 55%.
 In the 1990s, Argentina shifted 
its heavily state-managed energy 
sector to private ownership and 
introduced a series of other energy-
related reforms. State oil, gas and 
electricity companies were mostly 
privatized and new policies and 
regulations promoted foreign 
investment in energy companies. 
Production of oil, gas and electricity 
went up, while costs per unit came 
down. Argentina became an energy 
exporter.
Since the country’s 2001-2002 
economic collapse, the Argentine 
government has kept energy prices 
artificially low. The price of oil is 
70% of its international reference 
price. Gas and electricity prices 
have fared worse at only 20% and 
30% of international references. 
Sustaining low consumer prices 
(which leads to inefficiently high 
use) requires the government to 
subsidize imports during months of 
elevated demand, with major fiscal 
consequences. During the first three 
quarters of 2010, the Argentine 
government spent approximately 
$4.5 billion on energy subsidies, or 
about 1.3% of GDP. From 2002 
to 2009, oil and gas subsidies cost 
the Argentine government $55 
billion. Energy subsidies have 
also been a source of friction in 
Argentina’s external relations; for 
example, high domestic usage 
allowed the Argentine government 
to halt exports of natural gas to its 
neighbor, Chile. 
Raising energy prices is an 
extraordinarily sensitive political 
matter in Argentina, as it is in many 
other Latin American countries, but 
it is essential for the health of the 
energy sector and for the country’s 
longer-term development. Without 
higher prices, neither foreign 
nor domestic investment will be 
available for energy exploration 
or production, and subsidies will 
continue to drain Argentina’s fiscal 
resources. ■
Pablo Fernández-Lamela is a Master 
of Public Administration candidate at 
Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy 
School of Government.
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Energy Consumption: Challenges 
and Opportunities of Urbanization
By Heidi Jane Smith
L atin America and the Caribbean is the most urbanized region in the developing world. Of the mega cities with 
populations of five million or more, 
eight are located in this region, 
and the World Bank estimates this 
number to increase to 15 by 2030. 
Faced with the challenges of rapid 
urbanization, a number of cities 
have developed innovative ways 
to deal with increased waste, air 
pollution and the rising cost of 
energy. The transportation systems, 
sanitation sites and waste-to-energy 
models developed in Latin American 
cities have been replicated around 
the world.
When the southern Brazilian city 
of Curitiba began growing rapidly 
in the 1960s, Mayor Jaime Lerner 
and his planning team restructured 
the city’s traffic flow to reduce cars 
in the downtown area. Curitiba 
lacked the funding for a subway 
system, so the team designed a 
system of express lanes to speed 
buses through traffic. The system 
saves around 27 million auto trips 
annually and approximately 27 
million liters of fuel. As a result, 
Curitiba uses 30% less fuel per 
capita than any other Brazilian 
city of its size and has one of the 
lowest rates of air pollution in the 
country. Curitiba residents spend 
only about 10% of their income on 
travel, much less than the national 
average, ensuring accessibility for 
low-income residents.
Bogotá replicated much of 
Curitiba’s transportation ideas when 
it created its own rapid transit 
bus system, the TransMilenio. 
Project development received 
unprecedented sub-national 
financing from the Inter-American 
Development Bank. Former Mayor 
Enrique Peñalosa, who presided 
over the initial project, is now 
advising other cities interested in 
building rapid transit bus programs 
of their own. 
A metropolitan giant of 20 
million inhabitants, São Paulo has 
used international cooperation 
from the EU and US to provide 
clean technologies around the 
city. Its waste-to-energy plants 
reduce approximately three 
million tons of municipal waste 
every year. By using a thermal 
treatment to decompose the 
garbage, these plants generate 
approximately 750,000 tons of fuel 
oil. The decomposition processes 
within landfills create anaerobic 
molecules that are absorbed into 
the atmosphere as H2O instead 
of greenhouse gases. With more 
than 13 million tons of CO2-
equivalent savings, waste-to-energy 
technologies are of particular 
interest for climate change 
policymakers.
Monterrey’s sanitation system was 
in the spotlight when Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton visited this 
northern Mexican city in March 
2009. The project is operated by a 
public-private partnership between 
Bioelectrical Monterrey, S.A. de 
C.V., the government of Nuevo 
León state, and the System for 
the Handling and Processing of 
Organic Waste (SIMEPRODE), a 
decentralized government agency. 
The renewable energy project has 
the capacity to capture 12 MW 
of electricity per day, sufficient to 
generate overnight public lighting 
for seven municipalities. According 
to SIMEPRODE, the plant has 
generated more than 400,000 MWh 
of power and avoided 85,000 tons 
of greenhouse gas emissions, or 
1,800,000 tons of CO2. The effect is 
equivalent to planting 970 hectares 
of forest.
Around the world, the rapid 
growth of cities is exacerbating 
global warming, with as much 
as 78% of total greenhouse gas 
emissions generated in urban areas. 
This transformation has enormous 
implications from an energy and 
climate perspective: Buildings 
alone account for up to 40% of 
the energy consumption of some 
countries, urban development 
patterns affect emissions from 
transportation, and solid waste and 
sanitation systems are significant 
sources of greenhouse gases. In 
some cases, however, the pressures 
of urbanization have provoked 
a response from cities to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. As 
the Latin American cases above 
illustrate, how cities develop and 
respond to energy challenges today 
will have an indelible impact on 
the world’s carbon footprint in the 
future. ■
Heidi Jane Smith is a PhD candidate 
in Public Administration at Florida 
International University.
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T
he international 
price of oil has an 
enormous impact 
on the economies 
of the energy-poor 
countries of Central America and 
the Caribbean, nearly all of which 
are substantial importers of fossil 
fuels. Venezuela has been the 
region’s lone source of relief from 
the skyrocketing prices of recent 
years. It created PetroCaribe in June 
2005 to help Central American and 
Caribbean governments finance 
their oil imports. 
Today, PetroCaribe, which is 
managed by Venezuela’s national 
oil company, PDVSA, serves 17 
of the 24 Central America and 
Caribbean countries, excluding 
Barbados, El Salvador, Panama, and 
Trinidad & Tobago (the region’s 
only energy exporter). Although 
questions have been raised about 
PDVSA’s reporting, the Venezuelan 
oil company’s own figures show 
PetroCaribe supplied the region with 
approximately 160,000 barrels per 
day on average from 2007 through 
2009. This amounted to nearly 
20% of Central America’s and the 
Caribbean’s oil supply—although 
half of the total went to Cuba. 
The recipient countries benefit 
most from PetroCaribe’s special 
financing. As the price of petroleum 
increases, so does the amount 
PetroCaribe is prepared to finance. 
The terms become particularly 
generous when the price of oil is 
above $40 per barrel, which will 
likely be the case for some time 
into the future. The scheme is an 
intelligent one: the higher the price 
of oil, the greater Central America 
and the Caribbean’s need for 
help, but rising prices also expand 
Venezuela’s capacity to assist. When 
prices are low, Venezuela cannot 
help much, but the region also 
requires less assistance. 
Besides financing oil purchases, 
PetroCaribe has promised to 
contribute to the cost of developing 
and repairing refineries and other 
infrastructure. So far, repair of 
the Cienfuegos refinery in Cuba 
is the only project that has been 
completed. Plans call for building 
or repairing some 20 refineries in 
the next 10 years. Petrocaribe has 
also pledged to contribute to a food 
security fund for Central America 
and the Caribbean when oil prices 
exceed $100 a barrel.
PetroCaribe has been a 
constructive way for Venezuela to 
gain political influence. Venezuela 
has been criticized for seeking 
political advantage from its support 
of PetroCaribe, but this is an 
objective of almost all foreign aid, 
regardless of the source. Moreover, 
Venezuela has gained a measure of 
good will across the Caribbean and 
Central America as a result of its 
PetroCaribe mechanism. 
The longer-term prospects of 
PetroCaribe are uncertain. Despite 
high prices, the Venezuelan oil 
industry is deteriorating. PDVSA’s 
oil production has fallen by 
approximately one-third since 
1997 (from 3.30 to 2.20 mbd). 
Exports fared even worse; due to 
rising domestic demand, Venezuela’s 
shipments abroad dropped by one-
half (from 2.90 to 1.50 mbd). There 
is no question that PetroCaribe has 
become more costly to Venezuela, 
with shipments from PDVSA 
through PetroCaribe continuing to 
rise as a share of total oil exports. 
In response, Venezuela appears 
to be tightening the terms of its 
PetroCaribe sales. ■
Chris Cote is a program assistant 
for economics at the Inter-American 
Dialogue, where he specializes in 
energy and Brazil-related issues.
PetroCaribe: Welcome Relief for 
an Energy-Poor Region
By Chris Cote
Venezuelan President 
Hugo Chávez and 
Cuban Acting President 
Raúl Castro on 
December 21, 2007, 
in Cienfuegos, Cuba, 
at the fourth summit 
of PetroCaribe, an 
initiative created by 
Venezuela to provide oil 
to Caribbean neighbors 
at preferential prices. 
Photo: Adalberto Roque/
AFP/Getty Images.
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Venezuela’s Petro-Diplomacy
Hugo Chávez’s Foreign Policy
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Over the last decade, Venezuela has exerted an influence on the Western 
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